The Kremlin's Information Superweapon
Putin wields the deadliest information warfare weapon ever, and most people don't even know it exists.
Since my last post — which was, shamefully, a very long time ago — I quit all social media to focus on writing my fifth spy novel. If you haven’t read the first four, begin here.
Sometime in 2014, shortly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Russian government felt the need to shape narratives across the globe. It was rapidly dawning upon the Kremlin that British and American media were force multipliers whose influence across the world could not be overcome through official statements and press conferences.
The FSB, which succeeded the KGB as Russia’s principal security agency, had floundered badly during the 2011-2013 protests in Russia (the Snow Revolution). Its inability to cope with the use of social media to fuel and sustain the protests had to have weighed on Putin’s mind when he turned to Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU, for a solution to the problem of controlling narratives.
The director of the GRU, Lieutenant General Igor Dmitrievich Sergun, assigned the task to Unit 74455, which would later come to be known as the Sandworm Team.
Semyon Orlov, lingerie salesman
Concluding after a short study that credibility would have to be earned by showing complete isolation from every organ of the state, Unit 74455 turned to a blogger and lingerie salesman by the name of Semyon Orlov to begin building a globally effective information warfare operation. After a brief moment in the media spotlight — manufactured by the GRU — during which he criticised the Putin regime, Orlov fled Russia as a political dissident.
In order to avoid being linked to the Russian government, Orlov incorporated his company — искушать богов or Iskushat’ Bogov, literally ‘tempt the gods’ — in Hong Kong. Funds to the tune of hundreds of thousands of dollars from a non-profit controlled by the Russian Duma were routed by the GRU through intermediary NGOs. Another source of funds was the Russian International Affairs Council, a think tank chaired by Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Red flags ignored
With funds in place, Orlov built an organisation that specialised in ostensibly using open source information for intelligence analysis. While Iskushat’ Bogov’s reports were often of a high quality, for the first few years of its operation, critics missed out on the fact that an overwhelming majority of the reports targeted countries or entities considered hostile by the Russian government. By 2021, Orlov’s organisation disseminated 144 stories about the United States, 244 about the United Kingdom, but only 5 about Russia.
The fact that most of Orlov’s employees came with previous experience in the Russian military and intelligence agencies was somehow ignored, because here was a Russian dissident doing quality Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) work.
Their reports, however, began being taken as the gospel truth by mainstream media organisations across the globe. Using Orlov’s organisation, the GRU was able to plant stories about the CIA and MI6 across the globe. This included smearing a number of whistleblowers and professionals opposed to the Putin regime. Recently, Iskushat’ Bogov has lent its credibility to attempts at fanning anti-American flames.
Not what you think
Iskushat’ Bogov doesn’t exist. Nor does Semyon Orlov. But a former lingerie salesman turned blogger does sway public opinion through his OSINT organisation. This organisation has been funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). While officially it is a non-profit funded by the United States Congress, the idea belonged to Ronald Reagan’s CIA chief Bill Casey, who lobbied for it in this letter to Edwin Meese III, counsellor to Reagan.
The OSINT organisation’s founder also worked for the Atlantic Council, an American think tank that functions as a revolving door between the US government and industry.
Many of this OSINT organisation’s employees have been noted to have a military or intelligence background, notably with Britain’s NSA equivalent — GCHQ.
Former contributor Cameron Colquhoun’s past is even more suspect. Colquhoun spent a decade in a senior position in GCHQ (Britain’s version of the NSA), where he ran cyber and Middle Eastern terror operations.
Former contributor Chris Biggers, who penned more than 60 articles for the site between 2014 and 2017, previously worked for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
For six years, Dan Kaszeta was a U.S. Secret Service agent specializing in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and for six more he worked as program manager for the White House Military Office.
Nour Bakr previously worked for the British government’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office while Karl Morand proudly served two separate tours in Iraq with the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division.
Leaked documents have shown that this organisation worked with the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office to “weaken Russia”, and has produced topical reports based on the UK government’s requirements.
The OSINT organisation went after Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) whistleblowers, Wikileaks, and other journalists in an attempt to smear them in the sordid politicking that followed the alleged chemical weapons attack on the Syrian city of Douma in April 2018.
Recently, it contributed to a 60 Minutes report that sought to place the blame for Havana Syndrome on Russian intelligence agencies, specifically the GRU. Which begs the question, who is using Bellingcat (and other contributors to the 60 Minutes report) to whip up tensions between the United States and Russia to fever pitch? Is the British tail trying to wag the American dog?
“I don’t want to be too dramatic, but we love [Bellingcat].”
—Marc Polymeropoulos, former Deputy Chief of Operations, CIA.
Good stuff !
Nice article but ended rather abruptly I felt. Also I lost the plot when OSINT entered the picture after what was a fascinating read about the operation carried out by the GRU